Ransomware resistance

Ransomware that reaches a hypervisor encrypts the guests and then looks for the backups. This page says what kcore does so the backups are still there, what it does not do, and what you have to set up yourself. The backup half is kcore Vault. The hypervisor half is the way kcore nodes are built and updated.

The attacker you are planning for

Someone has an operator password, a stolen client certificate, or root on a hypervisor node. They want to delete or overwrite every copy of your data before they demand money. A backup that the same credentials can reach is not a backup.

Vault: what stops a delete

ControlWhat it does
Separate machineVault runs on its own appliance, not on a hypervisor node. Its disks, accounts, and OS are not the cluster’s.
Pull onlyThe mover on a node serves extents read-only. The appliance pulls. A node holds no credentials for the repository and cannot push, overwrite, or delete a backup.
Retention only moves forwardEvery stored object has a retain_until time. A later job can extend it. Nothing can shorten it. Delete before that time returns still locked.
Object Lock offsiteAn S3 bucket with Object Lock takes each object in COMPLIANCE mode. The bucket itself refuses delete and overwrite until the date, including from the account that wrote the object. This is the grade called storage-enforced.
Encrypted and signedData is chunked, encrypted, and packed. The manifest is signed. A tampered pack or manifest fails verify instead of restoring bad data.
Two-person approvalDeleting a target, lowering retention, installing a licence, and changing a role wait for a security officer, a different role from the person asking.
Roles and TOTPViewer, backup-operator, restore-operator, admin, security-officer. Admin and restore roles must enrol TOTP before the console opens.
Own credentialsThe coordinator reaches the cluster with a certificate whose role is backup-operator: it can snapshot and read a volume, not manage the cluster. A cluster admin does not get Vault access from that.
Verify and restore drillsverify create --full reads objects back and checks them. A restore writes a volume back through the cluster API to Ceph, LVM, or ZFS. Practise it.

Grades are honest

The console shows a grade per target. appliance-enforced (a ZFS dataset on the appliance) is enforced by the coordinator software. Someone with root on that appliance can delete the files. storage-enforced (Object Lock) is enforced by the bucket. none (S3 without Object Lock) is a cache. For a copy that survives a root compromise of the appliance, replicate to a locked bucket:

kcore-vault target apply offsite --backend s3 --location s3://vault-backups/prod
kcore-vault replicate create --source local --dest offsite
kcore-vault catalog import --target offsite

Create the bucket with Object Lock turned on before the first upload. It cannot be switched on later for a bucket that already has objects. The bucket owner’s credentials and who can delete the bucket itself are your problem, so keep them in a different account from the cluster’s.

The hypervisor side

What you still have to do

What this does not cover

kcore does not scan guests for malware. It does not stop an attacker who owns your cloud account that holds the locked bucket, or a security officer who approves what they should not. It makes the destructive path longer, noisier, and impossible for a single stolen credential.